happen if all member state governments approve a revision treaty, but one of the countries is unable to ratify it, arose already for the Maastricht Treaty, after the first Danish referendum, and for the Nice Treaty, after the first Irish referendum. In neither of these two cases did the other member states, or the EU institutions, officially argue that the other member states could go ahead without the recalcitrant state. They managed to find a 'soft law' solution which did not modify the agreed text but enabled these two countries eventually to approve the revision treaty in a second referendum, so that the EU legal rules for entry into force were entirely respected.
This time around, the argument that the majority of states should be able to go ahead with a Treaty revision even in the absence of some countries' ratification has been openly made, on three different occasions: during the work of the Convention, after the European Council of December 2003 that failed to conclude the IGC, and after Tony Blair's announcement that the United Kingdom would submit the Constitutional Treaty to a referendum. I will briefly review the political considerations made on those occasions and then explore, in a second part, the legal scenarios that would be available in case a ratification crisis actually happened.
Before looking at the most recent debates, it may be useful to recall an earlier example of a 'plan B', namely that proposed in the European Parliament's draft affirm that 'the constitutional treaty will not need the ratification of all Member states to take effect between countries having approved it, as long as the latter represent a very high percentage (yet to be defined) of the total.' He added: 'It is indeed unthinkable that future Europe's essential project, and two years of negotiations, can end up in the "dustbin of history" because at the last hour the Parliament of a small country changes its mind, or because the Labour Party returns to power in Malta (…)'. References to this question could also be found in documents of the European Parliament and the European Commission. In the European Parliament, a motion for a resolution presented by rapporteur Jean-Louis Bourlanges proposed the following new rule, which was similar to what was proposed in the EPC Draft Constitution:
'The ratification procedure should be revised with a view to ensuring that a small minority cannot block the ratification of the future constitutional treatyfor example, ratification could be secured by a dual qualified majority comprising at least three-quarters of the Member States representing at least three-quarters of the Union population -even if, in return, specific forms of cooperation must be negotiated with any Member State which does not ratify the Treaty.' 7 However, this particular paragraph of the motion for a resolution was deleted by a vote of the plenary in its December 2002 session, and the resolution as adopted by the European Parliament does not refer at all to the question of entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty.
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As for the European Commission, its official contribution to the Convention simply argued that entry into force is 'a matter to be studied in depth'. However, the rub with this 'gentle exit strategy' is that, as the Penelope study accepts, the preliminary agreement should itself be agreed upon and ratified by all member states before it can enter into force and effectively replace the current revision procedure of Article 48 EU. It seems quite likely, though, that a member state opposed to the content of the Constitutional Treaty would also refuse to ratify an agreement that is designed to facilitate the entry into force of that Constitutional Treaty, particularly if that could imply that it would be 'kicked out' of the European Union. Therefore, the Penelope group also included a last resort clause: if by a given date, the preliminary agreement has been ratified by at least five-sixths of the member states (so, presumably, 21 out of 25 states), then it will enter into force for all, disregarding the normal 'overall ratification' rule. So, when all is said, the Penelope 10 Penelope can be found on http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/const051202_en.pdf Study does affirm the need to adopt the 'constitutional rupture' approach, that is, the right for the overwhelming majority of states to move ahead with a Constitutional Treaty even against the opposition of up to four countries. expresses the hope that, if such a situation will occur, the European Council will be able to devise a cunning plan to save the Constitutional Treaty despite the opposition expressed in some parts of the Union's territory.
Let us now assume that something indeed 'goes wrong' during the national ratification phase, in the sense that one or more member states have 'difficulties' with the ratification process, because (presumably) the treaty has been rejected in a referendum. For now, the most likely candidate for causing such difficulties is the United Kingdom, but since its referendum is scheduled only for 2006, it is quite possible that a ratification crisis may erupt earlier due to other countries: Denmark or Ireland (the earlier culprits), or perhaps the Czech Republic, or France, or Poland, or the Netherlands. In view of the volatility of national electorates, there are in fact plenty of unknown national political constellations as regards the coming referendums. One of the questions arising then is which legal scenarios are available, under the present rules, for dealing with such a ratification crisis. 
II. The Legal Scenarios for Dealing with a Ratification Crisis

Some Legally Unavailable Options a) Partial Entry into Force and Creation of an 'Enhanced Union'
It is by no means unusual for universal treaties to be subject to ratification in all participating states. The danger of excessive rigidity is, however, often countered by the fact that those treaties provide for their entry into force after a certain number of parties have ratified, with the other states having the option of joining the first group later on in the life of the treaty. So, for example, the Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force after 60 ratifications had been lodged (12 years after its signature), the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties required 35 ratifications for its entry into force, which happened 11 years after signature, and the Rome statute on the International Criminal Court came into force after 4 years, upon the 60 th ratification.
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It is therefore accepted, in international law, that many treaties remain 'limping' for many years after their adoption. However, this is only allowed if that modification does not affect the rights that the non-participating states draw from the original treaty. This is obviously not the case for the Constitutional Treaty whose enactment unavoidably affects and modifies the existing rights of all the EU members. Therefore, under the current rules of Article 48 EU, all the member states must give their agreement to the changes.
The 'Nice Plus' Scenario
The most orthodox scenario in the case of a clear failure by one or more member states to ratify the Constitutional Treaty is that the European Council acknowledges that the Constitutional Treaty will not enter into force and that the relations between the member states (and the legal position of the EU institutions and the citizens) will Obviously, such informal applications of the Constitutional Treaty would require the agreement of all the member states. The government of a country that failed to ratify the Constitutional Treaty would have to tread with particular care for domestic constitutional and political reasons. And of course, informal application of an un-ratified Constitutional Treaty would increase even further the present opacity of the EU system, and therefore run counter to one of the main objectives which the Constitutional Treaty was set to achieve, that of increasing simplicity and transparency.
b) Closer Cooperation
The consequences of a ratification debacle could also be faced through increased recourse to forms of closer cooperation, both inside and outside the European Union system.
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The enhanced cooperation mechanism, which exists since the Treaty of Amsterdam but has remained unused, could operate in order to perform one of its original aims, namely to allow 'willing and able' member states to pursue deeper integration without passing through an intergovernmental conference.
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In using the enhanced cooperation mechanism, the pro-Constitution states would be constrained by the numerous rules and conditions set by the Nice Treaty (even though that treaty relaxed the even more stringent rules set by the Ansterdam Treaty). implications. This means, for instance, that the Nice mechanism could not be used for the ambitious new defence policy delineated in the draft Constitution.
Hence, in view of the restrictions imposed by the Nice regime for enhanced cooperation, the states wishing to move ahead in accordance with the content of the Constitutional Treaty could also launch forms of cooperation between smaller groups of member states outside the EU institutional framework. I have examined the legal issues raised by such partial agreements in another publication.
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Inter se international agreements between two or more member states of the EU are allowed, but only within the limits set by EU law obligations. Briefly said, this means that such agreements may not be concluded in areas of exclusive EU competence (e.g. in the field of trade or monetary policy), that they may not affect the normal operation of the EU institutional mechanisms (in view of the duty of sincere cooperation) and that they may not include any provisions that conflict with EU law or undermine existing EU policies, e.g. by discriminating on grounds of nationality in favour of citizens of some member states only. If, for instance, Belgium and Germany conclude a cultural cooperation agreement on the basis of which they grant education scholarships to each other's nationals, then the citizens of the thirteen other member states of the EU are excluded from the benefit of such a scholarship. This is in breach of EC law to the extent that citizens of other member states, residing in Belgium or Germany, may not apply for a scholarship. (Hart, 2000) 31. See also the study by L.S. Rossi, Le convenzioni fra gli Stati membri dell'Unione europea (Giuffrè, 2000) . 23 These are the legal facts of the Matteucci judgment of the ECJ (Case 235/87, Annunziata Matteucci v Communauté française of Belgium et al., [1988] ECR 5589) . 24 This aspect is highlighted, from a Commission perspective, by P. Ponzano, op,cit., at p. 554. and opaqueness of the EU system and reduce the scope for democratic control of the decision-making process.
Voice: The Renegotiation Scenario
Rather than admit defeat and proceed on the basis of the Nice Treaty, the European Council could also decide to face the misgivings emerging from a ratification crisis in one or more countries, while trying to keep the Constitutional Treaty alive. This is the 'voice' scenario, in which the views of the dissenters are taken into account by the supporters of the Constitutional Treaty with a view to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise.
The first option is to try to accommodate the dissenting state (or its dissenting electorate) within the bounds of the Constitutional Treaty as agreed by all governments at the IGC. This is, in fact, what happened after the unsuccessful Danish and Irish referendums earlier on. The diplomatic 'dialogue', in those two cases, was not aiming at a modification of the treaty as signed, but at a separate legal or political agreement that could pave the way for a second referendum on that same treaty. the essence of its neutrality despite the development of a common security and defence policy. However, the neutrality question was arguably not the central concern for most no-voters, and the main measures to convince the electorate to approve the Nice Treaty in a second referendum were taken at the domestic level, namely the creation of a National Forum on Europe, and the strengthening of national parliamentary control mechanisms on Irish EU policy-making.
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The question whether the Danish or Irish scenario could be repeated this time, in the case of a ratification crisis, depends very much on the circumstances. On those previous occasions, the crisis was caused by one single state, that happened to be a small state, and after rejection of the Treaty by a rather small margin of votes. If, this time, the Constitutional Treaty were to be rejected in a large member state, or in more than one state, or by a huge majority of the electorate, then an easy accommodation would be more difficult. What one could envisage, then, is a true renegotiation of the Constitutional Treaty, trying to accommodate the concerns that provoked its rejection in one or more countries (provided one can identify such concerns with sufficient precision) by modifying its text. Since the Constitutional Treaty will come into legal existence upon its signature, renegotiation means drawing up another treaty that would replace the Constitutional Treaty as well as revise the current EC and EU Treaties. That new treaty could either, if the disagreement relates to specific policies, provide opt-outs for the recalcitrant state(s) without modifying the content for the other states, or, if the disagreement relates to the general principles or the institutional reforms, it would change the relevant rules for all.
All states would then have to lodge a new act of ratification in the international law sense, but they would not necessarily have to repeat the entire national ratification process preceding that act. In particular, if the original Constitutional Treaty had already been approved by a referendum in country X, that country X fails to ratify and declares its wish to leave the European Union, the other countries might agree with that intention. The withdrawal of country X would, however, not directly pave the way for the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, Article IV-8 makes entry into force conditional upon ratification by all the signatory states, and country X is a signatory state … Therefore, what would be needed is a combination of two legal texts: an agreement in which all member states accept the withdrawal of country X and organize the future relations between country X and the remaining states, and a treaty concluded between the remaining states in which they adopt Constitutional Treaty-bis, which is identical to the original CT, with the exception of all the articles referring directly or indirectly to the withdrawing state.
Both these legal texts would have to be approved by the national parliaments, but would probably not have to be submitted to a referendum.
b) Forced Withdrawal
The previous option is based on the hypothesis that a non-ratifying state would be ready to exit from the European Union, if it could do so on sufficiently attractive terms. In fact, this is a hypothesis which some commentators have seen gaining consistency during the first stages of the UK referendum campaign. But it is equally, if not more, likely that a non-ratifying state would not be prepared to leave the Union but rather stick to the current Treaties. Could it then be forced out of the window by the other states?
As was bluntly stated by a judge of the German Constitutional Court: 'The talk that a rejection of the Constitutional Treaty would lead to the respective state's exclusion from the Union is nonsense.'
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The threatening words of Giscard d'Estaing, quoted above, that a non-ratifying state would create a problem for itself, and not for the Constitutional Treaty itself, are legally wrong and politically unjustifiable. It may seem difficult to accept that a small minority of the electorate of Denmark, Malta or even the UK could thwart the desire of the vast majority of European citizens to proceed with the Constitutional Treaty, but this is the rule of the game as it was agreed and re-agreed many times in the past, and which for every country has formed the basis of its membership. It cannot simply be set aside without the agreement of all member states. So, excluding a country from the European Union because it fails to ratify the Constitutional Treaty is out of the question.
c) Enhanced Union after Collective Withdrawal
There is a third form of withdrawal, though, which could achieve the same results as exclusion of the recalcitrant state but in a legally more orthodox (though highly acrobatic) manner. Faced with the inability of one or more states to ratify, the remaining states could decide to collectively withdraw from the European Union 
Conclusion
There are, thus, a number of ways to save the Constitutional Treaty, partly or wholly, in the case of a ratification crisis. None of those ways is easy and all of them require complicated legal arrangements that would be difficult to explain to the European citizens. The feasibility of the various options would depend on where the ratification crisis originates, and how many states and voters are involved in it. The fact that the legal scenarios depend closely on the political constellation of the day explains why many commentators flatly distinguish between a legal and a political approach to this matter, as exemplified by the following words of Giuliano Amato: 'Si un de nos pays vote contre la Constitution, légalement cela signifiera qu'elle ne sera pas approuvée.
Politiquement, rien n'empêchera ceux qui l'ont approuvée de signer entre eux un nouveau traité ayant le même contenu, en laissant les dissidents dehors. Ce serait très dur mais la seule solution possible.' 37 Indeed, many of the statements calling for the Constitutional Treaty to go ahead in case of a ratification crisis indicate that such an initiative should not be stopped by 'legal technicalities'. In other words, the 'vanguard states' could also choose to 'ignore the law' and sweep away the current EU and international law rules if this were needed to extricate themselves from a ratification crisis. The countries willing to forge ahead would be prepared to break the law and explode the longestablished institutional arrangements on the ground that the un-reformed European Union no longer allows them to pursue their most cherished political goals and interests. Such a revolutionary move requires strong political resolve and close cohesion among the members of the break-away group. At the present time, neither the resolve nor the cohesion seem to be there. In the absence of this revolutionary spirit, it may be a good idea to keep an eye on the legal technicalities, and patiently explore the resources that they can offer. 
